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Lifting Families’ Incomes
Patrick Nolan1
Introduction
On 27 May 2004 the minister of social development 
announced a number of tax-benefi t reforms (collectively 
known as Working for Families), to be phased in by 1 
April 2007 (Nolan, 2005). These reforms increased the 
generosity and lowered the clawback of the Family Tax 
Credit, established the In-Work Tax Credit, indexed 
the Working for Families Tax Credits to infl ation, 
removed the child components of main welfare benefi ts, 
changed the assessment, generosity and abatement of 
the Accommodation Supplement, and increased the 
Childcare and OSCAR Subsidy rates.2
Working for Families will account for an additional $1.6 
billion of welfare spending per annum, signifi cantly 
reduce child poverty, and improve fi nancial incentives 
to work for many sole parents. Yet there are concerns 
over the complexity and administrative cost of these 
reforms, fi nancial disincentives to work facing secondary 
earners, exclusion of recipients of main benefi ts from 
some assistance, and extension of assistance to middle-
to-high income families. Further, personal income 
tax burdens have been increasing due to the failure to 
increase income tax thresholds with infl ation since 1998, 
and labour productivity and wage rates remain much 
lower in New Zealand than in Australia. This paper thus 
argues that with the milestone of full implementation 
of Working for Families being reached, focus should 
now move beyond these reforms to a broader agenda 
for lifting families’ incomes.
To encourage debate on this agenda, this paper provides 
an assessment of four policy instruments for lifting 
families’ incomes. These are the:
• minimum wage;
• personal income tax scale (thresholds, rates and 
base);
• family and working tax credits; and
• main welfare benefi ts.3
The following section of this paper discusses trade-offs 
required in the design of income assistance policies 
and how increasing population heterogeneity makes 
reconciling these trade-offs more diffi cult. Four sections 
then summarise key issues related to the instruments for 
lifting families’ incomes. A conclusion summarises the 
general strengths and weaknesses of these instruments 
and emphasises the need for greater integration and 
reduced complexity in the design of income assistance 
policies.
Diversity and complexity
The design of income assistance policies requires 
trade-offs between objectives to be made. For instance, 
1 The author acknowledges helpful comments on this article given 
by Bob Stephens and John Prebble, both of Victoria University of 
Wellington, Susan St John of the University of Auckland, Jean-Pierre 
De Raad of the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research, and 
Jan Tame of the Inland Revenue Department. The views expressed,  
and any errors, in this article are solely the responsibility of the 
author.
2 This paper uses the recently introduced names for the Working 
for Families Tax Credits (formerly Family Assistance). The four 
programmes are the Family Tax Credit (formerly Family Support), 
Minimum Family Tax Credit (formerly Family Tax Credit), In-Work Tax 
Credit (formerly In-Work Payment) and Child Tax Credit (replaced 
by the In-Work Tax Credit but also grandfathered to ensure no 
‘losers’). A fi fth credit, the Parental Tax Credit, is not discussed. A 
similar re-branding of these programmes occurred prior to the 1999 
election and drew the following comment from the Hon Dr Michael 
Cullen: ‘The other issue that I really am totally baffl ed by is this issue 
of the change of names. ... As soon as one changes the name of 
anything of this sort in legislation, it means that the forms have to 
be changed. That will create additional expenditure for no purpose 
at all. I have, I suppose, just a sneaking suspicion that perhaps part 
of the reason for this is that it gives the Government an excuse for 
a larger advertising campaign on this legislation between now and 
the election’ (Hansard, 20 May 1999).
3 Given space constraints this paper omits discussion on 
accommodation and childcare assistance and child support. 
Discussion of these programmes can be found in Stephens (2003) 
and Cronin and Chapple (2007).
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competitive labour markets do not generally adjust 
wages (paid to individuals) according to the number 
of children in a worker’s family. Yet in order to ensure 
families have adequate incomes, policies target assistance 
according to family size. Consequently, when wages are 
low and family sizes large the income from work could 
fail to provide an adequate family income and be less 
than the income from transfers when not working. As 
a consequence of this dilemma, the design of income 
assistance needs to balance the goals of encouraging 
the supply of labour and ensuring adequate incomes, 
and this balance has to be found within a constraint of 
limited government funds (Mendelson, 2005; Nolan, 
2006).
Reconciling trade-offs between objectives has become 
increasingly diffi cult due to changes in patterns of 
family structures, labour market outcomes and policy 
settings. In the decades since 1984 New Zealand has 
experienced signifi cant changes in family structures, 
including the breakdown of the breadwinner model 
of social arrangements, increasing numbers of sole-
parent families and increasing numbers of dual-income 
families. Important changes in the labour market have 
also taken place, with labour market liberalisation being 
associated with increasing part-time and casual work, 
variations in weekly hours of work and variations in 
wage rates. There has been a decline in employment 
among prime working-aged men, particularly low-
skilled workers, and an increase in women’s employment 
rates and representation in managerial and professional 
occupations (Callister, 2004).
Further, while the social assistance and income tax 
systems were largely devised as separate systems, large 
proportions of the population are now affected by 
both systems simultaneously (Stephens, 1997). This 
greater interaction refl ects changes in family structures, 
labour market outcomes, and the designs of tax-benefi t 
programmes, such as the taxation of main welfare 
benefi ts and the provision of supplementary assistance 
to non-benefi ciaries. Over the last 20 years the income 
tax system has taken an increasingly prominent role 
in the provision of social assistance payments. This 
role has expanded further with Working for Families 
(Nolan, 2005).
These changes, particularly increased heterogeneity of 
family structures and incidence of part-time and part-
year work, increased the complexity of designing income 
assistance programmes. Greater variations in hours of 
work, for instance, have made it increasingly diffi cult to 
design hours-based thresholds to encourage people to 
move from part-time to full-time employment. Further, 
by the early 1980s increased numbers of social assistance 
recipients made responding to changes in the level and 
incidence of poverty through increasing levels of main 
welfare benefi ts more fi scally costly. Consequently, 
additional demands were placed upon supplementary 
assistance and private charity to address areas of 
emerging needs (Stephens, 1999). These additional 
demands upon supplementary assistance themselves led 
to increased complexity, due to the administration and 
compliance issues associated with these programmes.
The Working for Families reforms are the fl agship of 
the Labour-led government’s response to these issues. 
While there is much to commend in these reforms, it 
has been argued that they failed to recognise a number 
of implications of increasing diversity for the income 
assistance system (Nolan, 2005). This article thus aims 
to encourage debate on a broader agenda for lifting 
families’ incomes through providing an assessment of 
four policy instruments for doing so.
Minimum wage
On 1 April 2007 the largest increase in the minimum 
wage over the last two decades took effect, with the rate 
for people 18 years and over increasing from $10.25 to 
$11.25 per hour and for people aged 16 and 17 from 
$8.20 to $9.00 an hour. The government’s goal is to 
increase the adult minimum wage to $12.00 an hour 
by the end of 2008 if economic conditions permit. 
Concepts of fairness of reward and socially acceptable 
incomes are key reasons for having a minimum wage. 
However, raising the minimum wage may do little for 
affected workers for two reasons. First, increasing the 
minimum wage will increase the cost to employers of 
hiring low-wage workers relative to other inputs and 
could reduce demand for low-wage labour (Brown, 
1999). Secondly, the increase in the minimum wage may 
translate in little extra take home pay as wage increases 
reduce the income assistance that people on low and 
middle incomes may be entitled to (NZIER, 2007).
An increase in the minimum wage will raise a worker’s 
gross wage income (assuming they are not laid off 
or change their hours), but the change in their take 
home pay (net income) is less clear, being subject to 
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a complex set of tax-benefi t programmes. The New 
Zealand Institute of Economic Research (NZIER, 2007) 
estimated the gains from minimum wage increases for 
three family types for a range of hours of work. These 
estimates included income taxes, the ACC levy, clawback 
of main welfare benefi ts, and clawback of the Working 
for Families Tax Credits and the Accommodation 
Supplement. They showed that:
• The largest group of minimum wage workers was 
single people without children. The increase in the 
minimum wage to $11.25 increased the gross income 
of a single person working for 10 hours by $10.00 per 
week. Of this, however, they kept only $1.26 more 
in the hand, with $8.74 being clawed back by the 
government. For a further minimum wage increase 
to $12.00 (a gross increase of a further $7.50) this 
person kept only 95 cents more in the hand.
• A sole parent at 20 hours of work received no 
extra income in the hand from the increases in the 
minimum wage due to the dollar-for-dollar clawback 
of the Minimum Family Tax Credit (interaction with 
the ACC levy meant that the wage increase slightly 
reduced net income).4 
• Calculations for partnered parents also showed that 
clawback can leave little income from the minimum 
wage increase in the hand. More generally, part-time 
workers (accounting for signifi cant proportions of 
low-wage and sole parent workers) were particularly 
likely to lose the bulk of any increase in the minimum 
wage through clawback.
The NZIER concluded that many of the people that 
minimum wage increases aim to assist are the same 
people losing most, if not all, of their wage increases 
through clawback. Interaction between wage rates and 
tax-benefi t programmes means that even signifi cant 
increases in minimum wage rates (or more general 
increases in wage rates for low-wage workers) may do 
little for these workers’ net incomes, incentives for paid 
work and standards of living. It is thus necessary to 
recognise that individual policies that aim to lift gross 
wages will be affected by their interaction with the 
personal income tax scale and the clawback of income 
assistance.
Personal income tax
Clawback of minimum wage increases is one example 
of the interaction between wage rates and tax-benefi t 
programmes. A more general example of this interaction 
is refl ected in how the distributions of wage rates and 
hours of work (making up gross incomes) determine 
the coverage of personal income tax rates and levels 
of tax burdens. This can be illustrated by comparing 
differences in gross incomes and tax burdens in New 
Zealand and Australia.
The OECD’s recent Taxing Wages report concluded that 
a family at average gross manufacturing earnings with 
two children under 12 would face a lower tax wedge 
(including income taxes, superannuation contributions, 
social security levies and family tax credits) in New 
Zealand than in Australia. Yet this result is driven by 
differences in the distributions of gross incomes, rather 
than by relatively low income tax rates or generous tax 
credits (as claimed by some commentators), with New 
Zealand having relatively low labour productivity and 
wage rates. A partnered household with one worker at 
average manufacturing wage and two children under 
12 would have an average gross weekly income of 
NZ$805.00 in New Zealand but in Australia this would 
be AU$1,054.40. Adjusting the tax wedge for these 
differences in gross incomes illustrates that workers in 
New Zealand face higher tax wedges, as at most income 
levels the same income (adjusting for differences in the 
costs of goods and services) is taxed more highly and 
the levels of tax credits provided are lower.5
Changes to the distributions of wage rates and hours 
of work thus infl uence the coverage of personal income 
tax rates and levels of tax burdens. Wage increases, for 
example, mean that over time people slip into higher 
income tax brackets unless income tax thresholds also 
increase (fi scal drag). Yet in New Zealand since 1 April 
1998 the lower and middle personal income tax rates 
and thresholds have remained unchanged, and a new 
4 The Minimum Family Tax Credit underwent an infl ation adjustment 
of around two per cent from 1 April 2007. While recipients’ total net 
incomes may increase due to this adjustment, they would receive no 
additional income in the hand from the minimum wage increase.
5 While some commentators claim that in New Zealand income taxes 
are lower on low incomes and higher on high incomes than in 
Australia, even a cursory comparison of tax scales and other transfer 
programmes illustrates that this is incorrect. Average income tax 
rates are only lower in New Zealand than in Australia at very high 
incomes (around NZ$180,000) (ANZ, 2006).
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top rate and threshold were introduced on 1 April 2000. 
To illustrate the extent of this fi scal drag, increasing 
income tax thresholds to account for infl ation between 1 
April 2000 and the fi nal quarter of 2006 would require 
thresholds of:
• 15% up to $11,330 (currently $9,500);
• 21% up to $45,315 (currently $38,000);
• 33% up to $71,550 (currently $60,000); and
• 39% on income above $71,550.
Based on these thresholds and using the Treasury’s 
‘ready reckoner’ for estimating the revenue effects of 
changes to tax thresholds, rates and bases (Treasury, 
2006), the effect of fi scal drag can be estimated as being 
in the order of an additional $1 billion in income tax 
revenue per annum. (This fi gure is only a broad estimate 
of magnitude as it does not include estimates of the 
behavioural or macroeconomic effects of fi scal drag.) 
This ongoing increase in taxation due to failure to 
increase tax thresholds with infl ation has a real impact 
on family incomes, leads to increasing incentives for 
income tax avoidance and evasion, and has amplifi ed the 
growth in trans-Tasman income differentials (reducing 
the income tax base which, ceteris paribus, means forgone 
tax revenue).6
Increasing tax thresholds to account for infl ation from 1 
April 2000 would provide individual workers at a wage 
rate of $11.25 with the same dollar benefi t ($2.11 per 
week) whether they work 10, 20 or 40 hours per week. 
In contrast, if tax relief was provided through lowering 
income tax rates by two per cent (leaving thresholds 
at their 1 April 2000 levels) at a wage rate of $11.25, 
workers would receive $2.25 at 10 hours of work and 
$9.00 at 40 hours of work. In general, a reduction in 
tax rates provides a benefi t that increases with incomes 
and hours of work, whereas an increase in tax thresholds 
provides an equal (capped) benefi t to all people with 
incomes above the new threshold, irrespective of their 
total incomes or hours of work. For these reasons, ceteris 
paribus, a tax rate reduction is likely to have a higher 
fi scal cost than an increase in tax thresholds. The two 
per cent income tax rate reduction would, for example, 
account for a fi scal cost in the order of $1.6 billion per 
annum compared to $1 billion to increase income tax 
thresholds to offset fi scal drag since 1 April 2000.
Under the personal income tax schedule (based on 
individual incomes), the tax changes above would 
also provide single people and single-income couples 
(with and without children) on the same incomes with 
the same dollar benefi t. Some commentators have 
proposed providing tax relief through allowing couples 
to split their incomes for tax purposes. However, moves 
towards a broad-based and low-rate tax system over 
the last 20 years have reduced the dispersion between 
primary and secondary earners’ marginal tax rates 
and consequently the potential for income splitting 
to provide tax relief. Income splitting poorly targets 
assistance to low-income households, with almost 80% 
of the expenditure on income splitting going to the 
top 20% of earners (Nolan and Fairbrother, 2005). 
Income splitting would discourage secondary earners 
from working and would increase administrative 
complexity.7 Among OECD countries there has been 
a clear movement away from income splitting, partly 
motivated by desires to fund reductions in income tax 
rates through increasing tax bases.
Family and working tax credits
Family and working tax credits are able to provide tax 
relief on a more targeted (less fi scally costly) basis than 
changes to personal income tax scales, and as they are 
generally provided through personal income tax systems 
they are seen to more strongly reinforce work effort than 
main welfare benefi ts (Alstott, 1995; Nolan, 2005). 
The use of working tax credits is often part of a reform 
strategy emphasising active labour market policies 
(Adler, 2004). In New Zealand family and working tax 
credits provide assistance only to families with children 
(Nolan, 2006).
The Working for Families reforms represent a 
signifi cant increase in the generosity of family and 
working tax credits in New Zealand and will bring 
about a signifi cant reduction in the headcount rate of 
child poverty (Perry, 2004). Financial incentives for 
sole parents to work will be improved, but secondary 
6 Although Working for Families also creates work disincentives for 
secondary earners, these are larger with income splitting. Further, 
although income splitting would provide low-wage primary earners 
with a small improvement in their work incentives, this would not be 
as large as the incentives created by Working for Families.
7 Johnson (2005) considered Working for Families prior to the 
extension of the reforms following the 2005 general election. 
However, this extension reinforces the conclusions he reached, as 
the majority of higher income families receiving the extension are 
likely to be partnered.
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earners will face increased fi nancial disincentives for 
labour supply, which is signifi cant given the increasing 
proportion of expenditure going to partnered families 
(increasing from approximately one third to one half of 
the recipients of the Working for Families Tax Credits) 
(Johnson, 2005).8 There will be an increase in the 
compliance and administration costs of the tax-benefi t 
system, particularly due to the extension of an hours-
based eligibility criterion, and the greater receipt of 
assistance by working families may increase demand 
for combining the administration of assistance of tax-
based and welfare-based programmes. Concerns over the 
accuracy of payments to eligible recipients and ineligible 
recipients fraudulently receiving payments will become 
more prominent (Nolan, 2005).
As noted above, under the Working for Families reforms 
an hours-based eligibility criterion now applies for both 
the Minimum Family Tax Credit and the In-Work Tax 
Credit. Yet basing assistance on a prescribed number 
of hours of work is inconsistent with the market-
based setting of employment conditions, as a feature 
of many employment contracts is that an employee’s 
hours of work may fl uctuate with seasonal or economic 
conditions. Having thresholds based on work hours (in 
addition to abatement based on income) would increase 
the complexity of administration and may lead to greater 
uncertainty regarding the level of assistance available 
when making the transition from benefi t to work and 
when hours of work and earned incomes fl uctuate. 
Removing the hours-based eligibility threshold for the 
In-Work Tax Credit would improve fi nancial incentives 
for some primary earners to supply labour and would 
not lead to any fall in recipients’ assistance from Working 
for Families (Nolan, 2005).
The tight targeting of the Minimum Family Tax 
Credit means that under-payments or over-payments 
are relatively likely for this programme. Since this 
programme’s establishment in 1986, liberalisation of 
the labour market has been refl ected in greater part-time 
and part-year work, and family structures have become 
less stable and more heterogeneous. Recipients of the 
Minimum Family Tax Credit are therefore increasingly 
likely to change circumstances during the income tax 
year, and although the Inland Revenue Department can 
automatically adjust entitlements during the year for 
many taxpayers, the tight targeting of the Minimum 
Family Tax Credit reduces the effectiveness with which 
this assistance may respond to these fl uctuations. With 
the extension of this programme under Working for 
Families, these diffi culties will become more common. 
Removing the Minimum Family Tax Credit would 
provide sole parents who take up this programme with 
relief from the poverty traps that it creates, although 
this could lead to some sole parents delaying their exit 
from the Domestic Purposes Benefi t and could lower 
the level of assistance they receive from Working for 
Families (Nolan, 2005).
The levels of assistance provided by the Family Tax 
Credit currently increase with the ages of children in 
the family. These age-related scales are based on the 
assumption that children become more expensive as 
they age. However, the strength of this assumption 
has been questioned, particularly by research in the 
United Kingdom which found that age-related scales in 
tax-benefi t programmes in that country overestimated 
the extra costs of older children. There is a paucity of 
research on families’ spending on children by age of 
child in New Zealand against which to judge the age-
related scales in the Working for Families Tax Credits. 
Yet providing greater assistance to families with younger 
children would recognise the greater diffi culties that 
these families face in allowing both caregivers to work 
in the labour market (female participation increases 
strongly with age of children (Johnston, 2005)). 
Subsidising the withdrawal from the labour market of 
a caregiver with young children would also accord with 
child development objectives.
Main welfare benefi ts
Working-aged benefi ts differ in the degree to which 
they emphasise short-term fl uctuations in need, such 
as temporary loss of employment and support for 
childrearing, or longer-term incapacity to work due to 
invalidity or sickness. The total numbers of people in 
receipt of a main welfare benefi t have fallen since 1999. 
Yet there have been concerns at the rates at which, in 
response to increases in work requirements associated 
with the Unemployment Benefi t and Domestic Purposes 
Benefi t, recipients have switched to the Invalids Benefi t 
and Sickness Benefi t in order to remain eligible for 
assistance. To address this switching, measures to provide 
intensive employment support to people able to work 
have been extended to the Invalids Benefi t and Sickness 
Benefi t recipients.
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As well as the active labour market policy of intensive 
employment support, the government has revisited a 
proposal developed by the fourth Labour government 
in 1989 for a single core benefi t, where recipients receive 
a core benefi t with supplementary assistance provided 
on the basis of need rather than benefi t category. These 
reforms could signifi cantly simplify and reduce the 
administrative and compliance costs of the main benefi t 
system. Such simplifi cation, however, presents many 
challenges, including possible creation of short-term 
fi scal losses for some families, and requires signifi cant 
political support. For many families short-term losses 
from simplifi cation would likely be offset through 
increased rewards from work effort and changes to other 
components of the income assistance system.
The core benefi t reforms, along with the shifting of the 
child component of main benefi ts into the Working 
for Families Tax Credits, represent a signifi cant shift 
in the balance of the income assistance system towards 
supplementary assistance, with the Working for Families 
Tax Credits now accounting for a fi scal cost greater than 
either the Unemployment or Domestic Purposes Benefi ts. 
The balance of the tax-benefi t system has not been shifted 
to this degree since the 1991 reductions in main benefi ts, 
yet the indexation of the Working for Families Tax Credits 
will mean that, unlike after the 1991 reforms, the annual 
increase in main benefi ts for infl ation will not erode the 
relativities between main and (previously non-indexed) 
family and working tax credits.
The New Zealand Child Poverty Action Group has 
argued that the Working for Families Tax Credits should 
not be targeted on the basis of work effort and that the 
child component of main welfare benefi ts should be 
restored (St John and Craig, 2004; St John, 2006). These 
arguments refl ect a concern with immediately reducing 
child poverty. However, the relatively low degree of 
targeting of the Family Tax Credit would mean that 
increasing the generosity of this programme to offset 
any losses to low-wage families from the removal of the 
Minimum Family Tax Credit and In-Work Tax Credit 
would lead to a signifi cant increase in fi scal costs of the 
Working for Families Tax Credits. By increasing levels 
of main benefi ts, this approach would also fail to reduce 
the poverty traps facing low-wage families created by 
benefi t abatement.
The abatement of main benefi ts is a major contributor to 
poverty traps, where, due to taxation and the clawback 
of assistance, families have little or no fi nancial incentive 
to increase their incomes or hours of work. Currently 
Domestic Purposes benefi ciaries receive relatively good 
returns from part-time work. Returns for part-time work 
for benefi ciaries without children are less strong, as they 
face higher rates of benefi t abatement than Domestic 
Purposes Benefi t recipients on earned income between 
$80 and $180 per week. For all benefi ciaries fi nancial 
incentives for full-time work are less strong, however, as 
once full abatement of the main benefi t is faced there are 
relatively few fi nancial rewards from increasing hours of 
work until it is possible to exit the benefi t. Disincentives 
for full-time work are strongest for Domestic Purposes 
benefi ciaries, as due to the lower rates of abatement at 
lower income levels and the higher levels of unabated 
assistance the benefi t exit point is reached later for 
benefi ciaries with children. The Minimum Family Tax 
Credit aims to improve fi nancial incentives for full-time 
work for families with children, but creates poverty 
traps of its own.
This discussion illustrates a key trade-off when aiming to 
improve fi nancial incentives to work through lowering 
benefi t abatement at lower income levels: lowering this 
abatement comes at an economic cost of increasing 
abatement further up the income distribution (unless 
levels of assistance are also reduced, which may sacrifi ce 
income adequacy objectives). The degree to which these 
economic costs further up the income distribution 
outweigh the benefi ts from reduced abatement depends 
on numbers of people affected, estimated behavioural 
responses to fi nancial incentives from income assistance 
programmes, and value judgements regarding the 
income distribution.
Conclusion
This article contains a general assessment of four ways 
of lifting families’ incomes. The general advantages and 
disadvantages of these approaches are summarised in 
Table 1. Although discussed separately in this paper, 
the four approaches should be seen as components of 
a single income assistance system. As the case of the 
minimum wage illustrated, for example, it is important 
to recognise that individual policies that aim to lift gross 
wages will be affected by their interaction with taxation 
and the clawback of income assistance. Government 
policy often fails to take an adequately integrated view 
of these policies.
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Table 1: General advantages/disadvantages of income assistance programmes
Government policy must also recognise limits to the role 
of the income assistance system and the need to remove 
unnecessary complexity. The current system is complex 
because it aims to tailor assistance to a wide variety of 
needs, yet complexity leads to signifi cant administration 
and compliance costs and a system designed to be 
responsive being far from it. If the rationale for new 
programmes is to offset the impact existing programmes 
are already having on families (e.g. due to fi scal drag or 
poverty traps), then reform of existing programmes is 
required, not new programmes. Without this discipline 
there is a risk that the legacy of recent and proposed 
reforms will be an unsustainably complex and costly 
income assistance system.
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